Informationsheft GB
Handbuch für die Operation Seelöwe / Insiderwissen von Stevens und BestEines der interessantesten Geheimdienstdokumente, das die Alliierten nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg in Deutschland fanden, ist das "Informationsheft GB": Ein Handbuch für die von Hitler im Jahre 1940 unter dem Decknamen "Operation Seelöwe" geplante Eroberung Großbritanniens.
VON PETER KOBLANK (2006)
Geheimdienstchef Walter Schellenberg, damals Leiter der Gruppe "IV E Abwehr Inland" innerhalb vom "Amt IV Gestapo" im Reichssicherheitshauptamt, schreibt dazu in seinen Memoiren:
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Dieser Auftrag hatte großen Aufwand an Zeit und Geld erfordert. Nachdem das gesammelte Material vom Geheimdienst und dem wissenschaftlichen Forschungsamt des RSHA geprüft und schließlich von einem ausgesuchten Spezialistenstab überarbeitet worden war, wurde eine Auflage von zwanzigtausend Exemplaren gedruckt.
Im September 1940 hieß es dann plötzlich, die ganze Aktion Seelöwe sei abgeblasen." 1
Handbuch über alle wichtigen Aspekte des britischen Lebens
Dieses Handbuch, von dem am Ende des Krieges nur noch wenige Exemplare aufgefunden wurden, war ein Kompendium über alle wichtigen Aspekte des britischen Lebens: Geographie, Wirtschaft, politisches System, Aufbau der Regierung, Rechtssystem, Verwaltung, Armee, Bildungssystem, wichtige Museen, Presse und Rundfunk, Religion, Parteien, Emigranten, Freimaurer, Juden, Polizeiapparat und Geheimdienst wurden auf über 144 Seiten (englischer Nachdruck) erklärt.
Hinzu kam eine Sonderfahndungsliste GB mit über zweitausend Personen, die zu verhaften waren: Politiker, Schriftsteller, Journalisten, Geheimdienstleute, ja sogar der bereits 1939 verstorbene Sigmund Freud.
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Das "Informationsheft GB" erschien im Jahr 2000 unter den Titel "Invasion 1940. The Nazi Invasion Plan for Britain by SS General Walter Schellenberg" in einer englischen Übersetzung. 2
Dieser englische Titel ist irreführend, da es sich nicht um die Planung der Invasion Englands handelt, sondern um eine Dokumentation, die erst nach der Invasion bei der Implementierung eines Besatzungsregimes nützlich gewesen wäre.
Die Sonderfahndungsliste GB ist in diesem englischen Buch zwar nicht komplett, aber mit sämtlichen Namen der zu verhaftenden Personen in deutscher Sprache als Faksimile abgedruckt.
Kapitel über den Britischen Geheimdienst
Der größte Teil des "Informationsheft GB" bestand aus allgemein zugänglichen Informationen und war lediglich eine übersichtliche Zusammenstellung allgemein bekannter Tatsachen. Die einzelnen Kapitel stammten offensichtlich von verschiedenen Autoren.
Das letzte Kapitel behandelte den britischen Geheimdienst. Es war nicht nur sehr ausführlich (25 Seiten im englischen Nachdruck), sondern enthielt auch hochbrisante Details und kam offensichtlich direkt aus der von Schellenberg geleiteten Gruppe "IV E Abwehr Inland". Dieses Kapitel enthielt derart umfangreiche und exakte Informationen über den Secret Service, dass das gesamte Werk von den Briten sofort wieder weggeschlossen wurde.
Während in Großbritannien der Secret Intelligence Service strengster Geheimhaltung unterlag, war in dem deutschen Handbuch von 1940 nachzulesen, was die britische Öffentlichkeit erst 1966 erfuhr: 'C', der legendäre Chef des britischen Geheimdienstes, hieß Stewart Menzies; lediglich der Vorname war mit 'Stuart' falsch buchstabiert.
Insiderwissen von Stevens und Best
Die Informationen über den Secret Service und basierten weitgehend auf Aussagen von Richard Henry Stevens und Sigismund Paine Best, den im November 1939 beim Venlo-Zwischenfall unter Regie von Schellenberg nach Deutschland entführten britischen Geheimdienstoffizieren.
Es mag sein, dass der deutsche Geheimdienst darüber hinaus weitere relevante Quellen hatte. Im "Informationsheft GB" wird jedoch an zahlreichen Stellen ausschließlich und ausdrücklich auf Auskünfte und Einschätzungen von Stevens und Best Bezug genommen.
Die Insiderinformationen über den britischen Geheimdienst im "Informationsheft GB" beziehen sich unter anderem auf:
- Entstehungsgeschichte des Secret Service
- Grundsätzliche Unterschiede zwischen britischem und deutschem Geheimdienst
- Aufgaben und Arbeitsweise des Passport Control Offices
- Aufgaben und Arbeitsweise des 'Z'-Netzwerks
- Aufbauorganisation und Namen der leitenden Offiziere in der Londoner Zentrale
- Persönlichkeitsmerkmale von Best und Stevens
- Zahlreiche Namen und Anschriften von Geheimagenten in der Sonderfahndungsliste GB, teilweise gekennzeichnet mit "Täterkreis Stevens-Best"
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1) Walter Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, London 1956 (Deutsch:
Aufzeichungen, München 1979) 2) Invasion 1940. The Nazi Invasion Plan for Britain by SS General Walter Schellenberg, London 2000 |
Informationsheft GB
The Intelligence ServiceIn reply to a parliamentary question from a member of the Commons concerning the budget of the British Intelligence Service, a member of government explained: 'It is the nature of the Secret Service to be secret. Therefore it cannot be talked about. Any discussion would contribute to endangering secrecy.'
This principle has been applied to all areas relevant to the British Secret Service. Indeed, the secrecy begins with its official description, which nobody seems to understand in detail. Novels, films and articles by authorised outsiders and specialists have combined to cause more confusion than clarity about British Intelligence on our side, probably with the enemy's silent acquiescence. Sometimes we talk of the 'Secret Service', sometimes of the 'Intelligence Service'.
Captain Best and Major Stevens, who were captured by the German Service, have declared that there is not any comprehensive organisation called the 'Intelligence Service', but that a 'Secret Service' in our sense of the expression did not exist either. At best one could speak of 'SIS', the Secret Intelligence Service. Nevertheless they called their boss, Admiral Sinclair, the 'CSS', the Chief of the Secret Service.
This lack of precision is as characteristic as the deliberate decentralisation of the service's organisation which does not need to be disguised for technical reasons: these are the offices of the central authorities and the Passport Control Offices (PCOs) of the legations and consulate-generals. Many of its aspects are not disguised because they distract the attention of an enemy from the effective agencies. [...]
Before other sources are dealt with, the account given by Stevens and Best of their services will be set out, but it still remains to be seen whether they are speaking the truth, whether they have invented anything or whether they have left anything out of their account. Certainly, some of their evidence has proved to be correct; however, it must not be forgotten that they are only small cogs or, in the previously mentioned example, 'freemasons of a minor order'.
Stevens is known to have run the Passport Control Office in The Hague. Still a serving officer in the army, he came into contact with the Secret Service in India and Persia. As a linguist, he took over a position which was officially part of the consulate-general and therefore the embassy, although geographically it was separate. Its official description covered only a small part of its activities. Stevens and his staff were mainly concerned with the acquisition of military intelligence from and about Germany. They also accepted any other information which came their way and were, according to Stevens, 'interested in simply everything'. He claims that they were on their own, and that the staffing of the other PCOs abroad remained as vague to the head of the office as the detail of SIS's organisation and methods.
Stevens reported either to his boss, Admiral Hugh Paget Sinclair, or to the Admiral's headquarters housed at 54 Broadway Buildings, near St James's Park Station. According to Stevens, the Admiral had retired from active service when appointed head of the Secret Service, and was known as 'CSS'. His deputy was Colonel Stuart Menzies, a Scotsman who succeeded his boss on Sinclair's death on 4 November 1939. His ADCs were Captain Howard RN, Captain Russell and Hatton-Hall. Stevens seems to believe that Sinclair alone was responsible to the Cabinet via the Foreign Office.
Sinclair was reputed to have his offices on the fourth floor of the same building that housed the chancellery and registry. On the occasions when Stevens visited the building, he noticed that departments had been moved around within the building, but the second and fourth floors contained offices of private firms which were nothing to do with the service. On the first floor were the offices of the London PCO, which overlooked numbers 21, 23 and 25 of Queen Anne's Gate, the road running parallel to the Broadway.
The following sections were said to be Admiral Sinclair's responsibility: Administration, Military, Naval, Air, Communications, Political, Cipher, Financial, Press and Industrial.
Departmental Duties
- Administration Section: Head of Department: Captain Howard (RN); under him Commanders Slocum
and Bowlbey (uncertain spelling). Duties: Vetting of personnel, officers as well as civilian
employees and agents as identified by PCOs, which the department accepts or rejects.
The organisation of the entire service lies with Section 1, which distributes incoming intelligence.
Location: Fifth floor of Broadway Buildings. - Military Section: Head of Department: Major Hatton-Hall. No other officers. Duties: All intelligence
received is forwarded to him if it concerns the army. Stevens gives the following example: 'I inform the
department of an impending attack by the Germans. Section 1 passes the information on to Section 2,
where the intelligence is compared with information received from PCOs. Taking its own position, the
section then transmits the information to the War Office, probably the Intelligence Branch.'
Location: Fifth floor. - Naval Section: Head of Department: Captain Russell. No other officers. Duties: As in Section 2,
but for naval issues. Information is passed to the Admiralty, Naval Intelligence Division.
Location: Sixth floor. - Air Section: Head of Department: Wing-Commander (?) Winter-Bottom, assisted by two officers,
Adams and [?]. Duties: As in Section 2 and 3, but adapted to the needs of the RAF. Information is
sent to the Air Ministry, Intelligence Section.
Location: Sixth floor.
- Communication Section: Head of Department: Gambier Perry, calls himself Colonel but this seems to be
untrue. Stevens claims to know nothing about the department. It is reputed to have moved to Bletchley.
Duties: Wireless/radio communications, telephone, pigeon-post, etc.
Location: until recently in the Broadway building, floor unknown. - Political Section: Head of Department: Major Vivien, assisted by Police Officer Mills. (Vivien calls himself Major,
but he is also a police officer.) Duties: 'Counter-intelligence' (see below) in connection with MI5 (see below).
The handling of subversive movements, communists, fascists, etc. Control of enemies of the state in England.
Stevens and Best do not differentiate between counter-intelligence and espionage.
Stevens says 'they overlap so much, there can be no division'. The department keeps in contact with all political organisations for intelligence purposes. Stevens claims that he does not know the title of this sub-section of Section 6. The information by '101 B' (Agent von Hendricks in Antwerp, opponent of Pötzsch) was given by Section 1 to Section 6.
Location: Fifth floor. - Cipher Section (Cipher and Decipher Section): Head of Department: Not known. A retired colonel by the name of Geffreys
used to work there. Duties: Code breaking, preparation of own codes and codes for PCOs.
Location: Stevens does not know. - Financial Section: Head of Department: Commander Sykes. Duties: Allocation of funds for intelligence work,
salaries, etc., for PCOs and the Central Office.
Location: Fourth floor. - Press Section: Head of Department: probably Hennecker-Heaton. No other officers. Duties: Reading, supervision
of insertions, liaison with the press as necessary.
Location: Fourth floor. - Industrial Section (economic intelligence): Head of Department: Admiral Limpenny, retired. Duties: Collection
of information on the economic situation abroad, on how many planes have been manufactured, on coal production, supplies of raw materials. Processed information possibly sent to the Board of Trade.
Location: unknown [...]
The Z organisation was headed by Colonel Claude Dansey, who had been selected by Sinclair. He, in turn, had employed Best whom he had known from the First World War. Z kept a small office in Bush House, Aldwych, London WC2. Best's colleagues were Kenneth Cohan, codenames Cowan, Keith Crane and Robert Craig. At the outbreak of war Best's office had been amalgamated with Stevens' PCO. According to Best, Z, at least in Holland, was dissolved after his arrest.
Best sent his information to Sinclair by post and he used the firm Menoline Ltd as cover, whose address was 24 Maple Street, London Wl. Best was a director of the Dutch firm N.V. Menoline in The Hague. The directors in The Hague included John P. Richards and one of Best's colleagues in Z, Pieter Nikolaas van der Willik. [...]
Best is of a different opinion from Stevens, and unlike Stevens is not a professional soldier, but he is superior as far as experience in the intelligence service is concerned, and as a result his understanding is more penetrating. He combines these qualities with considerable character defects and a total lack of scruples. He is not a British officer like Stevens, but a civilian who loves to live well and acts as a successful businessman. He may therefore see things in a clearer light in spite of a pretended lack of significance, or he may say more than Stevens. [...]
It would be wrong to underestimate the enemy, but it would be equally wrong to admire him and to think of him as infallible. The British Service has a tradition of about three hundred years. In spite of its contradictions, the English national character has a flaw of putting tradition above all, retaining for as long as possible what might have been all right some decades before. It is possible that in an emergency the British would be capable of letting everything go and becoming surprisingly modern. It is also possible that it could be too late to change.
With almost cynical candour, Best complained contemptuously of the Intelligence Service's bureaucracy, greed and sheer heavy-handedness, but he added that the British are capable of a complete transformation when thinking that their country was in imminent danger, and that they are at their most formidable in that situation. [...]
| Der Textauszug beinhaltet die Einleitung des Kapitels über den britischen Geheimdienst auf Seite 122 sowie Abschnitte der Seiten 128 ff und 142 der englischen Übersetzung. Quelle: Invasion 1940. The Nazi Invasion Plan for Britain by SS General Walter Schellenberg, London 2000 |
Sonderfahndungsliste GB
| Seite 1 der 104-seitigen Sonderfahndungsliste GB. |
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